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Abstract 
The goal of this thesis was to study management accounting changes that took place at a 
healthcare company that was acquired by private equity investors. These changes were categorized 
by using management control systems framework developed by Malmi and Brown (2008) and 
subsequently analysed from an institutional perspective utilizing institutional framework by Burns 
and Scapens (2000).  
Private equity investors are known for implementing several changes within the companies 
they own, providing a window into studying the topic of management accounting change. In the 
context of Malmi and Brown’s (2008) framework, this case study’s changes constitute cybernetic, 
administrative and cultural changes. The empirical findings regarding the management 
accounting change from institutional perspective somewhat contradict with the institutional 
framework in terms of process of change and process of institutionalization. This case study’s 
findings showcase that the process of institutionalization may not be as challenging as Burns and 
Scapens picture it to be, especially if an organization’s prevailing institutions are weak and 
transient. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The goal of this paper is to study management accounting (MA) changes that took place in a Finnish 
healthcare company after it was acquired by private equity (PE) investors. 
Management accounting can be considered to be at the very core of organizational management. 
Providing information MA experts enable senior management to make decisions to run organizations. One 
could think of MA as an internal support mechanism for managers (Burns and Vaivio, 2001). On the other 
hand, management accounting systems can be seen as management’s control systems if they are put in 
place by managers to direct employee behavior (Zimmerman, 1997, 2001). 
On the face of it, management accounting as a function of organization seems a logical and easy to 
understand, supporting managers’ decision making with information. However, practically no organization, 
in the long run, can maintain competitive edge without changing. This applies to MA function of 
organizations as well. For example, if a company uses a lagging cost analysis model compared to its’ 
industrial peers, is it reasonable to assume this company would also start to lag in terms of profitability and 
effectiveness over time? As much as organizations need to change to maintain competitiveness in general, 
so does management accounting as a function. This brings up an interesting concept regarding management 
accounting: Management accounting change in organizational context. By analyzing MA change in 
organizational context, it is possible to study how the prevailing orgnizational institutions affect the 
implementation processes of management accounting change. This can’t be achieved just by analyzing what 
is changed in organizations’ management accounting, but also understanding the actual process of MA 
change. Therefore, this paper is not only interested in what parts of the healthcare company’s management 
accounting changed after it was acquired by the PE, but also how the process of MA change came about.  
In management accounting academia there’s been a lot of research regarding MA change, but the 
majority of this has focused on MA change as an outcome, rather than a process (Covaleski et al., 1993). This 
is understandable, considering outcome focused MA change research can give new insights into what are 
the best management accounting practices considering different contingent factors, such as environmental 
uncertainty. Burns and Scapens (2000) highlight that while research on MA change as an outcome is needed, 
there should be more studies on MA change as a process i.e. how the implementation of new MA routines 
and systems unfolds in organizational context; “why and how organization’s management accounting 
becomes what it is, or is not, over time.” (Burns and Scapens, 2000;4)  
Theoretical frameworks used in this MA change case study are management control systems (MCS) by 
Malmi and Brown (2008) and institutional framework by Burns and Scapens (2000). The MA changes private 
equity investors implemented within the healthcare company can be analyzed by using Malmi and Brown’s 
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MCS, whereas the institutional framework by Burns and Scapens can be used to reflect how the actual 
process of implementing these MA changes materialized. 
A central element to this thesis’ case study are private equity companies, who seek to acquire a 
majority stake in businesses, allowing them to shape companies’ strategies and implement changes they 
consider are needed. PE investors have different profiles, some investing in earlier stage businesses and 
being ‘hands on’ owners actively managing the company they invest in, whereas some PE companies target 
more mature businesses pursuing to turn good companies into great ones. A common thing for all PE 
companies is that they implement changes at companies they own, but the extent how minor or drastic 
these changes are, depends on the profile of the PE investors. In 1960’s ‘asset stripping’ was a label for PE 
investors who bought undervalued companies, then closed the businesses and sold the assets (Gilligan and 
Wright, 2014). On the other side of the PE profile spectrum are ‘hands-off, eyes-on’ PE companies, who 
monitor their investment but have basically no input in managing the companies they own, having a more 
passive approach (Gilligan and Wright, 2014). Therefore, companies acquired by private equity investors are 
interesting from management accounting change perspective as they are often likely to go through rather 
major organizational changes.  
The rest of this thesis is structured in the following order. Second section covers concepts associated 
with the MA change and the theoretical frameworks used in the case study of this thesis. In the third section 
the method and challenges of conducting an MA case study are presented. Fourth section constitutes the 
case study’s empirical findings. Fifth section provides analysis discussion of the empirical findings and the 
sixth section concludes the thesis.   
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
Malmi and Brown’s (2008) framework of management control systems was used to categorize the MA 
changes the PE implemented within the healthcare company. To develop understanding of the actual 
process behind the implementation of the MA changes, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) institutional framework 
was utilized. In their work Burns and Scapens (2000) make us of Old institutional economics, “as it provides a 
focus on organizational routines and their institutionalization” (p.4). Therefore in the context of this case 
study, the management accounting changes were studied from an institutional perspective i.e. how the 
changes in the healthcare company materialized and developed.  
Management accounting academia has produced an extensive body of research regarding 
management control systems. However, there seems to be a difficulty of defining what is exactly meant by 
MCS, what’s the relationship between MCS and MA, and sometimes management accounting and 
management control systems are used interchangeably (Fisher, 1998). A number of descriptions of MCS 
exist, some containing overlap while others are quite different from each other (Abernerthy et.al, 1996). In 
his view Chenhall (2003) considered MCS to be synthesis of MA systems and cultural controls, whereas Burns 
and Scapens (2000) would include cultural controls as a part of MA systems. In this paper Burns and Scapens’ 
(2000) somewhat broader concept of MA will be adopted, which in addition to “traditional” MA components 
also includes cultural controls and organizational structures as a part of management accounting.  
Zimmerman (1997, 2001) advocated a distinction between decision making and control when 
differentiating between MCS and MA. Some accounting systems in organizations are established to provide 
information to support decision making, while other accounting systems are put in place to control 
employee activities and behavior. If managers employ new accounting systems to produce information for 
their sub-ordinates decision making, and if goal congruence of these subordinates is left unmonitored, then 
the system is a decision support mechanism rather than a control mechanism. If an accounting system is 
used by managers to guide employee’s behavior, it is a control system. 
Malmi and Brown (2008) started to parse the definition of MCS from the perspective of the 
managerial problem of directing employee behavior. Systems, rules, values and other activities management 
put in place to direct employee behavior should be called management controls. If these are complete 
systems, instead of simple rules, they should be called management control systems. These are in contrast to 
accounting systems, that are designed to support decision making at any organizational level, but if these 
systems are not monitored by managers, they should not be termed MCS, but management accounting 
systems.  
According to Simons (1995; 5) “MCS are the formal, information based routines and procedures 
managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities.” Simons argues that these 
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information based systems become control systems when managers use them to influence organizational 
patterns. If not used for the purpose of altering or maintaining organizational structures, these information 
systems are decision support mechanisms, but not control systems. On the other hand Chenhall (2003) had 
narrower view, as he considered that accounting systems are never control systems, but always designed as 
a decision support mechanisms.  
 
2.1 Management control systems by Malmi and Brown (2008) 
 
 
 
Management control systems by Malmi and Brown builds on four decades of MCS research and is influenced 
by the likes of Chenhall 2003; Fisher, 1995, 1998; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 1980; 
Simons, 1995.  
Malmi and Brown deconstructed MCS by dividing it into five different control areas:  
 Planning 
 Administrative Controls 
 Cybernetic Controls 
 Reward and Compensation 
 Cultural Controls 
5 
 
2.1.1 Planning 
Planning enables management to set objectives across different functions of an organization, thus directing 
employee behavior. In addition, planning sets the desired level of behavior required from members of the 
organization. Furthermore, “planning enables co-ordination through aligning a set of goals across the 
functional areas of an organization, thereby controlling the activities of groups and individuals to ensure they 
are in line with desired organizational outcomes.” (Malmi and Brown, 2008; 291) Malmi and Brown divide 
planning into short term tactically focused action planning and more strategically focused long range 
planning.  
2.1.2 Cybernetic Controls 
Malmi and Brown (2008) listed four components of cybernetic controls 
 
 Budgeting 
 Financial measures 
 Non-financial measures 
 Hybrids (financial and non-financial measures) 
 
For a long time cybernetic principles have been associated with organizational control (Arrow, 1964; Daft, 
1983; Koontz and O’Donnel, 1968; Mintzberg, 1979; Strank, 1983). Green and Welsh’s (1988) definition of 
cybernetic controls was “a process in which a feedback loop is represented by using standards of 
performance, measuring system performance, comparing that performance to standards, feeding back 
information about unwanted variances in the systems, and modifying the system’s comportment”(p.289).  
Budgeting is one of the foundation principles of management control systems and its use is almost 
universal (Bunce et al., 1995). Hansen credited this to budgeting’s “ability to weave together all the disparate 
threads of an organization into a comprehensive plan that serves many different purposes, particularly 
performance planning and ex post evaluation of actual performance vis a vis the plan” (Hansen et al., 2003: 
p. 96). Malmi and Brown (2008) elaborated that “while budgeting may have number of uses, including 
integration of processes and resource allocation decisions, as a control mechanism its focus is on planning 
acceptable levels of behavior and evaluating performance against those plans”(p.293). 
Financial measures used by managers are common way to set targets and direct subordinates 
behavior. Malmi and Brown (2008) make a distinction between budget and financial measures, stating that 
“budget is a broad, complete technique, whereas financial performance measures can be used in a narrow 
simple fashion in target setting”(p.293). Return on investment or EBITDA are examples of typical financial 
measures.  
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Organizations are increasingly focusing on non-financial measures as a part of management control 
systems to maintain competitiveness, as focusing only on financial measures may give somewhat limited 
view on organization’s performance. Also increase in other management initiatives, TQM for instance, is 
partly causing this (Ittner and Larcker, 1998). Fourth component of cybernetic controls is hybrid performance 
measurement system, which includes both financial and non-financial information. Balanced scorecard is an 
example of a hybrid that has become popular lately (Ittner and Larcker et al., 1998). 
2.1.3 Reward and compensation controls 
Reward and compensation controls pursue to improve the efficiency of organizational members by unifying 
the interests between the organizational members and the organization (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). If 
managers want to control and stimulate employee behavior to certain direction, implementation of reward 
and compensation systems is a common tool in trying to reach target goals.  
2.1.4 Administrative controls 
“Administrative control systems direct employee behavior through the organizing of individuals and groups, 
the monitoring of behavior and who you make employees accountable to for their behavior, and the process 
of specifying how tasks or behaviors are to be performed or not performed” (Malmi and Brown, 2008; 293). 
In their definition, Malmi and Brown consider administrative controls to construct of three different areas:  
 
 Organization design and structure 
 Governance structures within the firm 
 Procedures and policies 
 
Organizational design is a control mechanism, as different organizational structures can be used to stimulate 
different organizational activities (Abernethy et.al, 1996). In his definition Flamholtz (1983) argued that 
organizational structure contributes to control by “reducing the variability of behavior and, in turn, 
increasing its predictability” (p.158). Malmi and Brown (2008) consider organizational structure to be part of 
management’s control systems, although some researchers don’t agree with this view, stating organization’s 
structure is imposed on managers as a contingent factor and thus not for them to utilize as a control 
mechanism. 
The governance structure as part of administrative controls involves organization’s board composition 
as well as different steering groups and management teams (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Abernethy and Chua 
(1996) argue that governance imposes accountability within the organization. Malmi and Brown (2008) 
continue this by stating governance structures also create “systems which are in place to ensure that 
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representatives of the various functions and organizational units meet to co-ordinate their activities both 
vertically and horizontally.”(p.294) 
2.1.5 Cultural controls 
Flamholtz’s (1985) definition of culture is “the set of values, beliefs and social norms which tend to be shared 
by organizations’ members and, in turn, influence their thoughts and actions” (p.158). This view enjoys 
broad support in accounting-related research (Birnberg and Snodgrass, 1988; Dent, 1991; Pratt and 
Beaulieu, 1992). While organizational culture is something that might sometimes be out of management’s 
reach, it is still part control systems if it can be used to direct employee behavior (Clegg et al., 2005). Malmi 
and Brown (2008) define cultural controls to consist of three areas: 
 
 Value controls (Simons,1995) 
 Symbol controls (Schein, 1997) 
 Clan controls (Ouchi, 1979) 
 
Examples of value controls are organization’s mission, vision, logos, credos and senior management’s 
statements (Simons, 1995). These values are communicated throughout the organization in order to 
establish the right set of beliefs among employees. In his view, Schein (1997) described symbol controls as a 
way to create a particular kind of organizational culture. Ways to achieve this include designing specifically 
characteristic work spaces or requiring certain dress code among employees. Third area of cultural controls 
is clan controls developed by Ouchi (1979). Clan control is based on an idea of how different subsets of 
organization impose their values and skills on new members of those subsets.  
2.2 Institutional framework by Burns and Scapens (2000) 
In order to understand the process of MA changes PE implemented within the healthcare company, 
institutional framework by Burns and Scapens was used in this case study.  
Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework posits that management accounting systems and 
practices constitute organizational rules and routines. “The framework explores the complex and ongoing 
relationship between actions and institutions, and demonstrates the importance of organizational routines 
and institutions in shaping the processes of management accounting change.”(p.4) Burns and Scapens 
(2000) make use of institutional theory called old institutional economics (OIE) in forming their institutional 
framework as it “provides a focus on organizational routines and their institutionalization.” (p.4)  
“Management accounting is perceived as a routine, and potentially institutionalized, organizational 
practice, thus when analyzing management accounting change the focus is on studying changes in 
8 
 
organizational routines” (Burns and Scapens, 2000; p.5). Burns and Scapens start building the institutional 
framework from a dualistic assumption that “management accounting practices can both shape and be 
shaped by the institutions which govern organizational activity” (p.5). Being institutionalized means MA can 
endorse the ‘taken for granted’ ideas of behaving in an organization (Mouritsen, 1994).  
Key concepts to this framework are rules, routines, actions and institutions in organizational context, 
which are further explained in the next section. 
2.2.1 Rules, routines, actions and institutions 
Organization’s management accounting systems can be considered to be end product of rules and routines 
put in place and reproduced over time. Rules tell ‘how things should be done’, while routines are ‘how things 
are actually done’ (see Scapens, 1994). An example of management accounting rule is a budgeting 
procedure, picturing how budgeting should be done. While this new approach to budgeting can be formally 
recognized in the organization, it is possible the actual way of doing budgeting never changes and remains 
intact. Thus the routine of doing budgeting in the organization doesn’t change, and adapting the new rule is 
offset by the existing routine. A common occasion for implementing new MA rules is after acquisition, if new 
owners consider that MA changes within the acquired company are needed. However, it’s not uncommon to 
see problems arise after trying to implement new rules on acquired company’s management accounting. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) state that in situation like this typical reason is resistance within the acquired 
organization due to strong institutions and routines in place and unwillingness to change them. However, 
during enactment of new MA rules routines will develop and these routines will be reproduced (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). This leads to rules being established and new routines emerging (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
This process can also happen vice versa, new rules emerging from routines, leading to formalizing these 
routines as new rules of MA. 
In summary, rules are the formal statements how processes should be conducted, whereas routines 
are the practices how these processes are actually conducted. “Rules are normally changed only at discrete 
intervals; but routines have the potential to be in cumulative process of change as they continue to be 
reproduced. The extent to which certain routines are changed however, can depend on other existing rules 
and routines, including control procedures.” (Burns and Scapens, 2000; p.7) From MA perspective, rules are 
the formal MA systems, but routines are the MA practices in use. (Burns and Scapens, 2000) 
In addition to rules and routines, Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework uses concepts of 
institutions and actions. Being institutionalized means a certain pattern of behavior, or action, has become 
integrated into organization’s code of conduct. If certain management accounting routines have been 
reproduced over a long period of time, these routines become unquestioned way of acting for organizational 
members as they are done automatically, eventually becoming institutionalized. Essentially, institutions are 
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organization’s members’ beliefs of how things should be done and viewed, or as Burns and Scapens put it 
‘shared taken for granted assumptions’. These beliefs and assumptions, institutions, then modify actions of 
organizational members. However, some institutions are established faster than the others, and all 
institutions are not established to the same degree (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). Naturally, some institutions 
are more accepted than the others. Institutions that enjoy broad acceptance are more likely to remain 
unchanged and continue to influence action, whereas unpopular institutions are more prone to changes 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  
2.2.2 The process of institutionalization 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2 the process of institutionalization is pictured. Vertical arrow on top represents institutional realm, 
whereas vertical arrow at the bottom represents realm of action. “Both realms are ongoing in a cumulative 
process of change through time, however change processes in the institutional realm occur over longer 
periods of time than change in the realm of action. Institutions have an immediate impact on action i.e. how 
members of organization act and behave, but actions affect institutions only over time, if at all. The central 
Figure  2. The process of institutionalization 
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part of the figure illustrates the way, in which rules and routines act as the modalities which link the 
institutional realm and the realm of action” (Burns and Scapens, 2000; 10). Arrow a (encoding) depicts 
institutions effect on rules and routines. Organizational routines are influenced by the prevailing institutions. 
Routines will form new rules which, over time, results in revising or strengthening the existing routines. As 
explained earlier, implementing new rules can also affect existing routines. However the extent to which this 
happens, depends on the contrast in nature between new rules and existing routines. In arrow b (enacting) 
rules and routines materialize, as members of organization act according to them. Rules and routines enter 
the realm of action, so to speak.  Arrow c (reproduction) emphasizes reproduction of organization’s 
members’ actions. This reproduction can further entrench the prevailing rules and routines. It is also possible 
that actors start to question the validity of existing rules and routines, which over time could start the 
process of shaping new rules and routines. Arrow d (institutionalization) depicts how routines and rules can 
eventually become organizational institutions. In this transition rules and routines are no more ‘how things 
should be done’ or ‘how things are actually done’, but they have transcended organizational manners and 
become a part of unquestionable beliefs and taken for granted assumptions, guiding the actions of the 
organizational members. “Institutions always exist prior to any attempt by the actors to introduce change, 
and will therefore shape the processes of change” (see Bashkar, 1989). Burns and Scapens (2000) add to 
Bashkar by highlighting the importance of analyzing the existing institutions when studying management 
accounting change.  
2.2.3 Institutional change – three dichotomies 
In previous section the process of institutionalization and key concepts to the institutional framework were 
introduced and established. For categorizing and defining between different types of change processes, 
Burns and Scapens (2000) came up with what they call three dichotomies:  
 Formal vs. informal management accounting change 
 Revolutionary vs. evolutionary management accounting change 
 Regressive vs. progressive management accounting change 
 
Formal vs. informal management accounting change 
Formal change is rooted in conscious action, for example when new rules are introduced or through the 
behavior of a strong individual (see Rutherford, 1994). In contrast, informal change occurs in cumulative 
process over time. Tracking of informal change can be challenging, as there is no distinct ‘point’ when the 
change takes place. Existing MA routines are an example of accumulation of informal changes, as MA actions 
have been reproduced in changing conditions, eventually leading to the formation of those MA routines. 
Introducing new formal MA changes (rules), such as new budgeting procedure, can be somewhat 
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straightforward, but in order for this new budgeting rule to become implemented i.e. actual way of doing 
budgeting (become routinized), formal changes usually need to be accompanied by informal changes in 
order to be effective. Thus the success of formal MA change depends on whether the informal MA change 
occurs concurrently. In line with Burns and Scapens (2000) assumption, it’s reasonable to expect that 
introducing top-down MA changes in organization will have the biggest effect on formal rules of 
management accounting systems, but rather indirect effect on informal processes which are the key to 
accessing the actual MA routines. Bottom-up changes on the other hand are more likely to have direct 
impact on informal processes, as they are initiated by those who actually use MA and are aware of the 
existing routines. As a result (of bottom-up initiated changes) the formal processes will usually come to 
resemble the informal processes. 
 
Revolutionary vs. evolutionary management accounting change 
Nelson and Winter (1982) emphasize the importance of dichotomy between evolutionary and revolutionary 
change in any MA change study. The major distinction between the two is the extent to which MA change 
affects prevailing institutions and routines. Revolutionary change refers to a large scale revamp in existing 
institutions and routines, whereas evolutionary change results only in minor changes.  Burns and Scapens 
(2000) remind that small MA changes can have broad effects on the existing institutions and, on the other 
hand, big MA changes can end up having only minor effects on institutions and routines.  
 
Regressive vs. progressive management accounting change 
Tool (1993) introduced the dichotomy between regressive and progressive change (see also Bush, 1987). The 
dichotomy is based on a concept whether organizational structures allow or deny the development of new 
MA activities. Tool expressed the dichotomy in terms of ‘ceremonial’ and ‘instrumental’ behavior. 
Ceremonial refers to organizational structure which hinders the seeking of new and best solutions to MA 
systems by maintaining the existing (political) power structures, whereas instrumental structure encourages 
individuals to develop best MA practices. Tool named ceremonial behavior as ‘regressive MA change’ to 
describe how it opposes institutional change by trying to maintain the existing conditions. For instrumental 
behavior Tool adopted the term ‘progressive MA change’, encapsulating the idea of an ongoing development 
of institutions and displacing ceremonial behavior.  
2.3 Merging the two theories 
In this case study management control systems framework by Malmi and Brown (2008) was first used to 
categorize and conceptualize the changes the PE investors implemented within the healthcare company. 
After developing an understanding of what changes the PE implemented, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
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institutional framework was used to analyze how the actual process of implementing these changes 
developed. These two theories were chosen for this case study analysis because of how they both assume a 
somewhat broader understanding of management accounting. For example, both of these frameworks 
consider organizational structures and cultures to be vital part of management accounting, whereas some 
researchers and frameworks have much narrower view of management accounting in organizational context 
as explained earlier. Therefore it was important to choose two theories which share the same principles and 
key ideas of management accounting and changes thereof although these two theories are used for different 
purposes, MCS for categorizing the MA changes and the institutional framework for understanding the MA 
change process. The two frameworks also helped to formulate relevant questions for the interviews, thus 
making the data collection and subsequent data analysis more comprehending. 
 
3. Method 
To acquire information of sufficient depth and quality for this case study, a qualitative approach was chosen. 
In order to understand and analyze management accounting changes in this particular case, a quantitative 
method would’ve lacked in explicit nature of information that was needed to conduct this study. The 
challenge when studying a management accounting change, and especially the process of MA change, are 
the somewhat ambiguous concepts and terms associated with the subject matter. For instance, the other 
framework used in this case study, the institutional framework by Burns and Scapens (2000), constitutes 
several highly abstract ideas such as organizational institutions and routines, which can be difficult to point 
out and track down in an applied case study. This in itself excludes the possibility of conducting a 
quantitative MA change study, and even when having a qualitative approach, the challenge of certain 
aspects such as institutions and routines still remains as they mainly exist in the realm of organization’s 
members’ personal experiences. As these concepts are subject to a rather high degree of personal 
interpretation, it should be noted that a completely objective MA change case study is somewhat 
challenging, if not impossible, to conduct. This not only depends on how the researcher makes subjective 
analysis and conclusions based on the data, but the data itself can be distorted as it is collected in interviews, 
which are based on organizational member’s subjective opinions and perceptions. This problem came up 
also in one of the interviews, when the interviewee replied to a question by saying “well, the answer 
depends on who you ask that question within this company”. In order to decrease the distortion of the data 
and the subsequent analysis, interviews were conducted with three different people. Had only one people 
been interviewed for this case study, the analysis would’ve been highly susceptible to this one person’s 
personal judgements and perceptions, and possibly distorting the final conclusion drawn from this MA 
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change case study. As a whole the MA change is a complicated field of study, as there aren’t definitive or 
explicit answers.  
To obtain data, three semi-structured interviews were conducted. The questions and themes of the 
interviews were sent to interviewees before the interviews took place. Regardless, the structure of the 
interviews was not fixed to follow only these specific questions, the questions rather served as a platform for 
the topic to be discussed. All of the interviewees had been working at their respective positions for most of 
the PE ownership of the healthcare company, validating their views on the topic. At the healthcare company 
interviews were conducted with CEO, CFO and business controller. An interview was also scheduled with the 
PE company’s country manager, who also serves as member of the board for the healthcare company. Due 
to the country manager’s congested schedule this interview was delayed four times and eventually had to be 
cancelled due to the approaching deadline for this thesis.  
 
4. Empirical findings 
This section covers the changes the PE implemented within the healthcare company and how the prevailing 
institutions enabled the change process to commence. 
 
4.1 Management accounting changes the PE implemented 
Before the private equity investors took over the healthcare company through a leveraged buyout, it was 
listed on public stock exchange. In the early 2000’s, the healthcare company had grown rapidly through 
acquisitions, mainly by buying several smaller independent healthcare clinics. The problem was that these 
different clinics were never properly integrated into the parent company’s management accounting systems.  
 
“Before the PE bought us, the structure of this company was incredibly fragmented. We were 
basically several companies although we were supposed to be one company. When the PE came 
in, they integrated what seemed to be an endless amount of loose ends within this company and 
actually made this into a proper business. This meant integration and centralizing of all the 
internal reporting, procurement, financial accounts and statements, software and different 
platforms. The PE investors also wanted to heavily emphasize the importance of financial ratios. 
As a CFO this made my collaboration with them smooth as we spoke the same language, 
money.” (CFO) 
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The several smaller clinics the healthcare company had bought in the early 2000’s had huge potential for the 
company, but due to the incomplete integration of these clinics this potential was never fully reached. 
However, after the PE took the healthcare company private from the stock exchange, the process towards 
reaching that full potential began through integration of several MA systems and practices as the CFO 
described. The PE investors felt that major changes were needed to improve the healthcare company’s 
performance. This resulted in the PE employing a very ‘hands-on’ approach after the acquisition also in 
terms of personnel.  
 
“When the PE took over, several key employee positions were changed. For example, we had 
four or five of their own business controllers working for us for a while. For a couple of months 
we also had an interim CFO who was an employee of the PE company before the new CFO was 
appointed. Eventually they also replaced the CEO.” (Business Controller) 
 
The private equity investors considered the change in key management positions was needed to turn the 
company around. By changing the managers the PE also lowered the resistance towards new MA and other 
organizational changes that were to be implemented later. The old managers were entrenched in their own 
thinking and opinions, and would’ve made the change process more challenging due to their disagreements 
with the PE over certain aspects of the business. With the new management the changes were easier to 
implement from the PE’s perspective. The business controller also agreed with the CFO’s view that the 
financials were heavily emphasized after the takeover.  
 
“First and foremost, they wanted to emphasize the cash flow. Financial target ratios they 
wanted us to achieve were very strict and ambitious, the company’s cost structure was 
thoroughly examined and all the different investment projects were now required to go through 
a thorough business case analysis.” (Business Controller) 
 
The financial aspects of the business were prioritized as the PE had used high financial leverage for the 
acquisition, something private equity investors are known for. The PE required a detailed analysis of the 
company’s cost structure to get rid of the unnecessary expenses that were not affecting the core business. 
The healthcare company was also required to hit very ambitious financial ratios, a clear sign from the PE 
about the level of performance they demanded. The policy regarding investments became much stricter as 
the attention to detail in analysis and investment calculations became much more prominent as all the 
investments were now required to go through a business case analysis.  
The healthcare company’s balance sheet went also through a proper examination. After the several 
acquisitions in the early 2000’s different assets had accumulated into the balance sheet, and these 
15 
 
possessions had nothing do with the core healthcare business. The PE wanted to dispose of these non-
performing assets.  
 
“You could say they wanted to some cleaning when it came to the balance sheet. For example 
we owned shares of random public companies, which had nothing to do with our core business. 
The PE sought the highest possible yield and reward for their risk and wanted to squeeze 
everything they could out of the balance sheet. Also a rather significant laboratory department 
they deemed unnecessary, was sold.” (CFO) 
 
The PE also turned to external consultants in improving the healthcare company’s performance. Europe’s 
leading consultant agency in occupational healthcare was hired to revise the healthcare company’s 
performance metrics. The consultants developed an entire new program that would be a better fit for the 
healthcare company to start improving its’ care quality, leading to better financial results.  
 
“The consultants who were hired had developed several occupational healthcare business 
models in European context. First they analyzed what changes were needed in our business 
processes. Then they proved this with references and all the medical units and departments 
started to conduct the changes the consultants deemed necessary. Examples of processes that 
lacked and needed more concrete measuring were effectiveness of medical care, process lead 
time of employees involved in healthcare such as doctors and nurses and how the doctors 
conducted invoicing. Developing metrics and measuring these processes resulted in higher care 
quality and over time it reflected in our financials.” (Business Controller)  
 
Also a new organizational structure was created for the purpose of better communication between different 
departments within the healthcare company. As the CFO explained the structure of the healthcare company 
had been very fragmented due to the incomplete integration of the acquired healthcare clinics throughout 
the early 2000’s. In order to increase horizontal information flow the new CEO appointed by the PE created a 
matrix organizational structure for the healthcare company. This new structure increased flexibility and 
sharing resources between different departments and units, which over time led to better healthcare quality 
and financial results. 
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4.2 Enabling the change process 
When the private equity investors acquired the healthcare business, the general direction of the company 
was somewhat lost or unknown. The PE wanted to clarify the direction where they wanted to take the 
business. According to the CEO, the particular PE which took over the healthcare company was the right fit 
for this job. 
 
“When private equity investors acquire a business, they usually have only one agenda, a clear 
plan where they want to go with the business, whereas companies over time have several 
agendas which are revised and executed throughout business and life cycles. The agenda of this 
company was unclear, and when the PE came in, they clarified this agenda with the company’s 
management. PE investors differ on many levels, but one way to look at it is if they look to 
expand the business or make a turnaround. At that time, this company definitely needed a PE 
that’s specialized in turnarounds, whereas if it was bought by a PE that’s known for expanding 
business, it would’ve not been a good fit. Back then the changes that were required for this 
company to turn its’ course were rather significant, and that’s why the PE also needed to be of 
the right profile and caliber.” (CEO)   
 
As covered in the previous section, the PE implemented several changes within the healthcare company. 
Majority of these changes were introduced top-down, which meant a possible resistance and a clash 
between the PE (and the top management) and the healthcare company employees. Though according to 
the CEO, the changes were broadly accepted among the employees: 
 
“What happens when an employee considers a change process is something he/she can’t accept 
or go through? They vote with their feet. When I was appointed as the CEO by the PE, we started 
implementing several changes we considered necessary. It was around 2010, so the financial 
crisis and the previous poor performance of this company had really affected the financial 
situation of this business. I believe most of the employees were aware of this, and accepted the 
changes we implemented as necessary. … When you’re working with PE investors as a CEO, it’s 
very similar to working as an entrepreneur, you have to buy into their vision. It’s very different to, 
say, managers of companies like Nokia who are basically glorified public officers.” (CEO) 
 
The medical professionals neither expressed any larger sign of resistance towards the changes, or the PE as 
an owner of the company in general.  
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The PE didn’t want to intervene in the core work medical professionals do, which is taking care of 
the patients. It goes without saying, but the PE knew the medical professionals know better 
when it comes to taking care of the patients. On the other hand the medical professionals didn’t 
express resistance towards the changes or the more financially focused management of the 
company, as it was generally pretty well known that the company’s financial situation wasn’t 
great.” (CFO) 
 
Although some of the changes such as the new performance metrics for the medical processes of the 
business were implemented and this led to adjustments in the processes of the medical professionals, these 
changes were no problem for them because the changes didn’t intervene with the core of their work, which 
was taking care of the patients. The business controller agreed with the CEO and the CFO that the 
atmosphere within the healthcare company towards the new changes was open and not reluctant, and 
credited this to two things: The company’s financial situation was generally well known and the proof the 
external consultants provided about the changes that were needed. 
 
“The PE spent a lot of resources, namely their own employees, on making the turnaround of this 
company. They had a very ‘hands-on’ approach, and you could see this at the ‘factory floor’. I 
would say we were at the same wavelength with the PE and their employees pretty much from 
the start. Most people were aware of the difficult financial situation of the company, and later 
the external consultants hired by the PE provided proof and references how the business 
processes could be improved. People were aware that the change was needed.” (Business 
Controller) 
5. Analysis  
In this section the empirical findings are discussed in the context of the theoretical frameworks presented 
previously in this paper. As noted earlier this thesis assumes a broader concept of management accounting 
similar to Burns and Scapens (2000). In addition to traditional MA components this approach includes 
organizational and cultural controls as parts of MA. 
5.1 Empirical findings summary 
In the context of management control systems framework by Malmi and Brown (2008), the PE implemented 
administrative, cybernetic and cultural controls within the healthcare company. Integration of the different 
clinics and MA systems and creating the new matrix organizational structure for the purpose of better 
communication and resource sharing between units and departments can be categorized as administrative 
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controls. Cybernetic controls constitute emphasizing cash flow and financial ratios, requiring more detailed 
and thorough investment scenario calculations, developing new KPI’s for the healthcare processes and 
integrating the new business model for occupational healthcare designed by the external consultants. The 
cultural controls are the changes in the healthcare company’s personnel. The PE appointed new top 
managers, such as the new CEO, and employed their own professionals such as business controllers to work 
at the healthcare company.  
5.2 Institutional change 
It has been said by quite many that people resist change (Strebel, 1996). The problem with a generalization 
like this is that it overlooks the contingent factors of the environment where the change is supposed to take 
place. If members of an organization feel as if there is no external pressure to conduct a change process, 
such as no threat of becoming unemployed, then it is rather logical to expect that the people want the status 
quo to maintain and continue to operate with the existing routines and institutions. But if organizational 
members are aware of the adverse environmental contingent factors, which over time can lead to adverse 
effects on the organization and the members thereof if changes are not commenced, then it is reasonable to 
assume that changing the existing routines and institutions becomes much more attainable. This is what 
seems to be the defining factor in this case study’s institutional perspective. As the healthcare company’s 
financial situation was unstable after a period of poor performance coupled with the ongoing financial crisis, 
the members of the organization became aware of the difficult situation. In other words, the contingent 
factors had weakened the healthcare company’s institutions, as the company’s challenging financial situation 
made the atmosphere among employees less resistant towards changes.  
Most of the implemented cybernetic and administrative control changes were initiated top-down 
(formal MA change). According to the Burns and Scapens (2000) the top-down approach is challenging if the 
intention is to access organizational routines and institutions. Burns and Scapens (2000) argue that for 
actions to become routines and eventually institutions, there needs to be a sufficient amount of 
reproduction (Figure 2, arrow c). However, this assumption doesn’t seem to completely hold in the context 
of this case study. The formal top-down changes the PE implemented were quickly adopted within the 
healthcare company. This can be credited to the weak institutions within the healthcare company in the first 
place which resulted from the unstable financial situation as organizational members were aware that 
changes were needed. Whether these top-down initiated changes were revolutionary or evolutionary i.e. 
how much they exactly affected the existing institutions in addition to the existing routines, is challenging to 
analyze. The new routines were adopted fast, but how long it took for these routines to become 
institutionalized (Figure 2, arrow d)?  According to Burns and Scapens (2000) major MA changes can have 
small effect on institutions and on the other hand minor MA changes can have broad effect on institutions. 
19 
 
The cybernetic and administrative control changes the PE implemented were of the major magnitude, but 
this doesn’t automatically result in major institutional changes. It is reasonable to assume that the new MA 
routines were institutionalized over time but during which time period exactly is hard to grasp, as the 
organizational institution is a highly abstract concept that exists only in organizational members’ cognition 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). This observation of quickly adopting new top-down initiated routines applies to 
both the cybernetic and the administrative controls the PE implemented. The replacement of the top 
managers, the cultural control the PE implemented, can be considered as a progressive change. The former 
management disagreed with the PE over certain aspects of the company’s business and was unwilling to go 
through with some of the changes the PE required. The former management’s conduct can be considered as 
ceremonial behavior as they wanted to hold on to the existing institutions, but the subsequent replacement 
of the management personnel led to instrumental behavior and progressive change as it enabled the 
implementation of new ideas within the organization.  
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to study management accounting changes that took place at a healthcare 
company that was acquired by private equity investors. For the purpose of categorizing the changes the PE 
implemented, management control systems framework by Malmi and Brown (2008) was used. These 
changes constitute administrative, cybernetic and cultural control systems. Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
institutional framework was utilized to facilitate understanding of the change process. The findings of this 
case study partially disagree with the institutional framework’s process of institutionalization -concept. Burns 
and Scapens (2000) argue that formal top-down initiated MA changes require extensive reproduction among 
organizational members before these changes are routinized and later possibly institutionalized. According 
to the data and the analysis of the interaction between the PE and the healthcare company, this was not the 
case. Instead of extensive reproduction, this part was for a lack of a better word ‘skipped’, as the healthcare 
company’s employees adopted the new routines on the fly. This can be explained by the low resistance 
towards the changes within the healthcare company, which on the other hand can be explained by the weak 
institutions at the time within the organization. Further, these weak institutions were a result of the 
employees’ awareness of the difficult financial situation. Therefore, Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional 
framework and the process of institutionalization are perhaps more apt to describe institutional changes at 
organizations that have rather strong institutions in the first place. Organizations such as this case study’s 
healthcare company that have weaker and more transient institutions may not be as optimal for the Burns 
and Scapens (2000) institutional framework. This conclusion by no means refutes Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
institutional framework, but rather illustrates the incredibly complex topic that is the management 
accounting change.  
20 
 
It’s noteworthy to mention that analyzing the medical professionals’ institutional stance was basically 
excluded from this case study. This is a direct result of how the PE conducted implementing the changes. The 
PE didn’t want to interfere with the core tasks of the medical professionals, apart from slight adjustments to 
the processes, because they knew the medical professionals had the competence to carry on their main task 
that was taking care of the patients. In a sense, they were an autonomous side in this MA change exercise 
whose routines and institutions were never tried to expose to changes, and therefore remained intact. 
Possible research topics for the future include a more in depth analysis of how the strength of 
prevailing organizational institutions or the lack thereof enables or prevents management accounting 
changes. Studying MA changes at an organization that has very strong institutions would also be interesting 
from the perspective of testing how Burns and Scapens (2000) institutional framework holds up in those 
circumstances. On the other hand, research on whether private equity investors systematically tend to buy 
companies that have weaker and more transient institutions would also explain how the change process is 
usually rather extensive in PE owned organizations.  
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Interviews: 
 
1) CEO, The healthcare company, 4.5.2018, 22 min 
2) CFO, The healthcare company, 3.5.2018, 40 min 
3) Business Controller, The healthcare company, 4.5.2018 24 min 
 
An agreement was made that the names of the company and the representatives would not be 
published 
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